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ON THE ROOTS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT:
“WRONG EQUILIBRIUM” OR “MISCOORDINATION”?
JOSÉ PEDRO PONTES AND TELMO PEIXE
Abstract. This paper examines the Big Push industrialization model due
to [Murphy et al., 1989] by featuring a game where public and private agents
must coordinate their complementary investment decisions and the outcome
where all agents invest dominates in payoffs the no-investment alternative.
Two different paths of analysis are pursued. If the coordination game has
complete information, the selection of the “right” equilibrium appears to be
easier if the initial level of total factor productivity (TFP) is not too low. The
comparison of the “payoff dominance” and the “risk dominance” criteria due
to [Harsanyi and Selten, 1988] shows that the ability to plan jointly different
kinds of investment relaxes the constraint on initial TFP. Industrialization can
be alternatively modelled as an incomplete information game. In this case,
underdevelopment follows from a coordination break, where typically the Gov-
ernment supplies infrastructures which remain underused because the private
sector fails to modernize. We find out that such a coordination break is likelier
in economies where the starting level of TFP is low. Consequently, a low initial
TFP level tends to create a “Poverty Trap”, which however can be overcome
by enhancing the ability to coordinate different kinds of investment, namely
public and private.
JEL classification: O10, O14, C71, C72, C73.
1. Introduction
The traditional paradigm of development economics introduced by
[Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943] and [Murphy et al., 1989] henceforth labelled as MSV-
explains the persistence of underdevelopment by means of a “poverty trap”, which
we can describe in the following way.
The stagnant economy is viewed as being composed by a list of sectors producing
different and complementary goods. Each sector contains many small competitive
firms working under a technology with constant returns to scale, where labour is
transformed into consumer goods according to fixed proportions.
Within each sector, there is a firm that can switch to an increasing returns
technology by using machinery and thereby raising labour productivity. While
doing so, the mutant firm can eliminate the traditional units by charging a limit
price that is slightly lower than the competitive price. This process is labelled as
a sectoral “industrialization”.
MSV model the process through a symmetric coordination game. If a sector
industrializes in isolation, the modern firm cannot break even. By contrast, if
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all sectors switch simultaneously from traditional to modern technology, the aris-
ing complementarities make the coordinated Big Push towards industrialization
economically feasible.
Although MSV do not use explicitly a game-theoretic framework, we gain in
precision by qualifying their model under this perspective. They model a symmet-
ric, complete information game, that is played simultaneously by many productive
sectors. In each sector, the player role is assigned to a firm that can chose one of
two pure strategies, i.e. to be either constant returns (“traditional”) or increasing
returns (“modern”).
This game displays two properties. First, it is a coordination game with two
symmetric Nash equilibrium points. In equilibrium, either all sectors become
industrialized or none does it. Second, the equilibrium where all sectors indus-
trialize dominates in payoffs the equilibrium with no industrialization. Following
MSV, rather than a technological improvement, industrialization implies crucially
a better coordination among firms investments.
It is well known that the selection of a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium in
a coordination game with complete information can in principle be achieved in a
fully non-cooperative way, without even allowing the participants to communicate
before the game (see [Harsanyi and Selten, 1988]). But it is also acknowledged
by MSV that such a coordination becomes more likely if explicit mechanisms of
investments planning are put in place. Hence, although the game is cast in non-
cooperative terms, it concerns a reality that is indeed collaborative in its essence.
The cooperative nature of this joint industrialization process was criticized
by [Hirschman, 1958] in the sense that underdeveloped economies usually lack
the capacity to negotiate agreements on overall investment programs.
Since [Nash, 1950] and [Nash, 1953], the selection of an equilibrium within a
non-cooperative game with multiple equilibrium points is viewed as a way of
modelling the negotiation leading to a final agreement. [Hirschman, 1958] tried
to reduce the Big Push situation to a purely non-cooperative game with a unique
equilibrium point. For that purpose, he replaced the simultaneous moves of the
Big Push by sequential ones, thus allowing the solution to be given by a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Many studies show that in coordination games with Pareto ordered equilibrium
points, the payoff dominant equilibrium is often not selected by experimental sub-
jects ([Van Huyck et al., 1990], [Van Huyck et al., 1991], [Cooper et al., 1990]).
Consequently, we decided to use the “risk dominance” solution concept by
[Harsanyi and Selten, 1988] as an alternative tool for selecting an equilibrium in
the coordination game following to motives. Firstly, the risk dominance criterion
has a much less cooperative flavour than payoff dominance, being less depen-
dent on pre-play communication and negotiation to be carried out and hence ap-
pearing less prone to [Hirschman, 1958]’s criticism. Secondly, many studies (such
as [Straub, 1995]) show that “safety” (i.e. risk dominance) considerations guide
the behaviour of experimental subjects. In contrast with the payoff dominance
criterion, other experimental studies (such as [Schmidt et al., 2003]) show that
the empirical use of a pure strategy by a player not only hinges upon whether it
is risk dominant in absolute terms, but it is also very much influenced by changes
in the relative degree of risk dominance.
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It is intuitive (but it will be formally demonstrated in section 2) that the relative
degree of risk dominance or “safety” of investment strategies is crucially dependent
on total factor productivity (henceforth TFP) in the economy. Moreover, studies
by [Aschauer, 1989] and [Barro, 1990] among others show that TFP is raised by
public capital or infrastructure, which can even increase the degree of returns to
scale in overall productive activity.
Although the traditional Big Push approach to industrialization by MSV in-
volves the coordination by symmetric firms, more recent studies such as the one
by [Daido and Tabata, 2013] highlight coordination between the Government and
the private sector of the economy. In the latter approach, a firm needs both a pri-
vate input of capital (typically a “machine”) and a publicly supplied infrastructure
input (a road, a school, a hospital) as a requirement to switch from constant to
increasing returns technology.
Then, we can describe the Poverty Trap underlying the lack of industrialization.
We feature an economy with insufficient infrastructures and consequently low ag-
gregate productivity (low TFP). Although in this economy the planning capacity
is scarce, this is clearly a coordination game situation. Either the Government and
the firms agree on investing and the combined move becomes profitable, or none
invests. Then, an initial low TFP level makes the private investment very unsafe
given since the firm is uncertain about the Government following suit. Conse-
quently, neither the public nor the private invest and the economy remains in a
state of low aggregate productivity, which closes a vicious circle.
While this view of underdevelopment as deriving from the selection of a “wrong”
equilibrium is internally consistent, it does not fully account for the persistence of
low aggregate productivity across regions and nations. Very often the stagnation of
TFP does not follow from a lack of investment in infrastructure. In many instances,
public investments grow up quickly but their impact on aggregate productivity is
hindered by a low quality of the infrastructure that is set up.
Starting with [Hulten, 1996], a large strand of literature tried to approximate
aggregate productivity by computing indicators of effectiveness of the of pieces
of physical infrastructure. Whenever public capital fails to achieve what it in-
tends to, firms are constrained to invest privately in complementary inputs (such
as private power generators) thus limiting their ability to invest productively
[Reinikka and Svensson, 2002]. Infrastructure falls short of its purpose either
because it is in poor condition due to defective maintenance, or it is oversized
[Rioja, 2003]. While these are different situations, they both derive from a lack of
coordination between complementary sectors builders and maintenance agents in
the former case; providers and users in the latter one.
There are several instances of missing coordination public investment and ag-
gregate productivity growth. [Pontes and Pais, 2018] show a significant correlation
over a cross section of European countries between the efficiency in highway use
and the growth in TFP. In addition, [Pontes and Buhse, 2019] find a speed of β
- convergence in the higher education schooling rate across 27 European coun-
tries between 2004 and 2018 which almost double than the corresponding speed
of convergence in real per capita GDP.
Rather than a coordination in a “wrong equilibrium” characterized by low over-
all investment, economic stagnation seems to be better described as the outcome
of a miscoordination across different kinds of investment, namely public and
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private. As it was argued by [Farrell and Klemperer, 2007], this means that the
focus of a game-theoretic analysis of underdevelopment should be shifted away
from the search of a Nash equilibrium point in pure strategies to the computa-
tion of a stationary point in mixed strategies, which are more compatible with a
miscoordination outcome.
This change of perspective does not imply that firms and the Government take
their decisions randomly. As [Harsanyi, 1973] put forward, the use of mixed strate-
gies merely rationalizes the imprecise nature of the information that each player
holds about the other participants payoffs. While each player observes the real-
ization of his own type, he only knows the probability distribution of the types
of the other participants. Hence each player models his imprecise knowledge of
the opponents payoff functions by behaving as if the opponent were using a mixed
strategy.
[Harsanyi, 1973] demonstrates that the Nash equilibria of this kind of incom-
plete information game are necessarily in pure, type contingent strategies. He
further proved that when the variances of the players types converge to zero, the
pure strategy equilibrium of the perturbed game approximates the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium of the original game.
At this stage, we must recall that a coordination game with incomplete in-
formation may in the limit have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies selected
through the “risk dominance” criterion. [Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993b] and
[Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993a] show that this might happen provided that the
players make different (but closely related) observations of the rules of a class of
games (or “global game”) defined by a set of parameters. This procedure approxi-
mates the common knowledge of the rules of the game that is usually presupposed
in the literature related with Nash equilibrium selection. By contrast, accord-
ing to [Harsanyi, 1973], each player knows exactly his own payoffs, while having
incomplete information about the opponents rewards.
If the situation where the Government and private firms have to decide to in-
vest or not invest appears repeatedly over time, what might be the evolution of
the decisions each of the players make in the future? Following [Young, 1993]
there are at least three possible explanations . One is a deductive theory by
[Harsanyi and Selten, 1988] arguing that some equilibria are a priori more reason-
able than others. A second is that players focus their attention on one equilibrium
because it is more evident (e.g. higher payoff with less risk) than the others, pro-
posed by [Schelling, 1980]. A third one, is an evolutionary explanation based on
the idea that, over time, expectations converge on one equilibrium through positive
feedback effects (e.g. [Lewis, 1969, Axelrod, 1986, Sugden, 1986, Bicchieri, 1990,
Wärneryd, 1990]).
In Section 2, we try to solve a standard industrialization game and select a
Nash equilibrium point in pure strategies. In section 3, we feature an incomplete
information game whose solution necessarily implies the possibility of miscoordi-
nation between public and private agents. In Section 4 we explore the evolutionary
approach to see which of the equilibria pure Nash equilibria in our coordination
game tends to be achieved if the game can be repeated over time. Finally, in
Section 5, the main conclusions are drawn.
ON THE ROOTS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 5
2. Underdevelopment following from a “Poverty Trap”:
coordination in the “wrong equilibrium” in the industrialization
game
In this section, we model the coordination of investments between the Govern-
ment and a sector of private firms by means of a 2×2 complete information game.
We assume that a set of competitive firms produces a composite consumer good.






where q is the quantity demanded, y is the consumers income and p is the product
price.
From the start firms use a traditional, constant returns to scale technology.
Labour is the numéraire in this economy so that the wage, w, is set equal to 1.
Since the traditional technology implies the transformation of one unit of labour
into one unit of output, the competitive price of the consumer good is also equal
to 1, thus ensuring that the equilibrium profit of the firms is zero.
Following MSV, we presuppose that one firm has the option to switch to a
modern, increasing returns technology. If this firm takes this choice, labour pro-
ductivity rises to α > 1 but the firm must buy and install a piece of private fixed
capital with the cost F . This technological change enables the firm to undercut
the competitive firms by charging a limit price slightly below the competitive price
and thereby become a monopolist.
Nevertheless, this technological transition is successful only if the Government
supplies the firm a piece of dedicated infrastructure (such as a road, a health
facility, or a training institution). Otherwise, while the firm incurs the private
fixed cost, its labour productivity remains stuck the traditional unit level. Hence,
its operating profit continues to be zero and the investing firm experiments a loss
equal to F .
Since the Government is a player in this situation, we need to make its payoff
explicit. If the private sector switches to a modern technology, the Government
gets a positive payoff δ from supplying a dedicated piece of public capital. Then,
the supplied infrastructure is used effectively by the private sector which pays a
“toll” or “fee” to the Government. If no infrastructure is built, the Government
obtains a zero utility. Finally, if the public investment is made but the private
sector fails to modernize, the newly created infrastructure is not fully used, thus
yielding a loss -δ for the public authorities.














y − F. (3)
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We assume that in addition to the wage each worker receives a dividend which








Solving together (3) and (4), the monopolists reward becomes
π = n (α− 1)− αF. (5)







a11 = δ > 0,
b11 = n(α− 1)− αF





b21 = −F < 0
a22 = 0,
b22 = 0
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the 2× 2 game.
The Big Push approach by MSV and [Daido and Tabata, 2013] contends that
this 2× 2 game has two properties. Firstly, it is a coordination game, with two
strict Nash equilibria, namely (Builds, Modern) and (Does not build, Traditional).
Secondly, the former equilibrium point dominates the latter in payoffs.
It is clear from Table 1 that both properties are ensured by the inequality
b11 = n(α− 1)− αF > 0,
which is equivalent to the condition
α− 1− αf > 0. (6)
In (6), f ≡ Fn stands for the private capital intensity of the economy.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for inequality (6) to be satisfied are




Conditions (7) are plotted in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the Big Push condition (7) is met in the green region. It is obvious
that this condition concerns the size of labour productivity in relation to (private)
capital intensity, i.e. the level of total factor productivity (TFP), which was firstly
defined by [Solow, 1957]. A “Poverty Trap” emerges clearly here. When aggre-
gate productivity is low, the modern technology is not profitable for the private
sector, which therefore does not address the Government a sufficient demand for
infrastructures. Consequently, no public investment is achieved thereby causing a
stagnation in TFP.
However, the achievement of a Pareto dominant equilibrium in a coordination
game usually implies a significant level of pre-play communication. Such a capacity
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Figure 1. Graph of the payoff dominant equilibrium conditions
in the coordination game of Table 1.
for planning and coordinating different types of investment is usually scarce in
developing economies as it was noticed by [Hirschman, 1958] .
A criterion for selecting an equilibrium point which needs much less pre-play
communication is the “risk dominance” concept put forward by
[Harsanyi and Selten, 1988]. According to this rule, each player selects the pure
strategy that is relatively “safer”, given the uncertainty that the player holds
about the strategy chosen by the opponent.
[Harsanyi and Selten, 1988] presuppose that the selection of a risk dominant
equilibrium is invariant both to linear positive transformations of the payoffs and
to the specific definition of the best reply relations between pure strategies. Thus,
we can apply several simplifications to the payoff matrix in Table 1. Firstly, we
multiply Player 1’s payoff by 1δ and Player 2’s payoffs by
1
n , so that the game














b21 = −f < 0
a22 = 0,
b22 = 0
Table 2. Payoff matrix of the 2× 2 game after a simplification of
the payoff matrix in Table 1: multiply Player 1’s payoff by 1δ and
Player 2’s payoffs by 1n .
Then, we change the definition of the best reply relations between pure strate-
gies in order to obtain a diagonal payoff matrix, as represented in Table 3.
Let s2 ∈ (0, 1) be a threshold such that, if Player 1 believes that the opponent
Player 2 chooses “Modern” with a probability higher than s2, then his strict best
reply against this expectation will be “Build (infrastructure)”.
According to Table 3, s2 is defined by the inequality,
s2 · 1 > (1− s2) · 1, (8)
















b22 = f > 0
Table 3. Payoff matrix of the 2× 2 game after a simplification of
the payoff matrix in Table 2: sum 1 to the Player 1’s payoffs when
Player 2 plays “Traditional”, and sum f to the Player 2’s payoffs





≡ s2 . (9)
Hence, the extent of the domain of beliefs by Player 1 about Player 2 behaviour
that drive him to select the strategy “Build (infrastructure)” will be inversely
proportional to s2 in the r.h.s. of inequality (9).
Then, let s1 ∈ (0, 1) be a threshold such that, if Player 2 believes that the
opponent Player 1 selects “Build (infrastructure)” with a chance higher than s1,
then his unique best reply against this belief is to switch to a “Modern” technology.
Again, following the payoff matrix in Table 3, s1 solves the inequality





≡ s1 . (11)
Consequently, the size of the set of beliefs by Player 1 about Player 2 behaviour
that drive him to select the strategy “Build (infrastructure)” will be inversely
proportional to s1 in the r.h.s. of inequality (11).
It is straightforward to infer that the size of the set of players expectations that
lead to the (Build, Modern) equilibrium point decreases with s1 + s2. According
to [Harsanyi and Selten, 1988], this equilibrium point will be risk dominant if,
s1 + s2 < 1 . (12)
Bearing in mind the definitions in (9) and (11), inequality (12) is equivalent to
the condition




The r.h.s. of the second inequality in (13) is a function of f with the same
domain and shape as the r.h.s. of the second inequality in (7), but it always stays
above it except for f = 0 (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Graph of the payoff dominant and risk dominant equi-
librium conditions in the coordination game of Table 3.
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, but region defined by α > 11−f , where the
equilibrium point with investment payoff dominates the no-investment Nash equi-
librium is further divided in two subregions by the condition α = 1+f1−f : the green
region, where the investment equilibrium point is not risk dominant; and the
yellow region, where it is payoff dominant and risk dominant.
The meaning of Figure 2 is clear. It is possible to launch a Big Push with a
limited amount of pre-play communication among the investors only if the starting
level of aggregate productivity under the modern technology is reasonably high.
By contrast, if the initial TFP is relatively low, as it happens in most developing
economies, then launching an overall set of investments requires a lot of previous
discussion, as a precondition to reach agreements. The fact that such ability to
coordinate and plan industrial investments lies at the core of the “Poverty Trap”
that hinders the development of backward regions and countries.
3. “Wrong equilibrium” or “miscoordination”?
The view of underdevelopment described above focused the selection of a “wrong”
equilibrium by all participants, so that low aggregate productivity hinders invest-
ment (both public and private), which in turn limits overall productive efficiency.
However, this perspective is not often confirmed by empirical evidence, which
shows that, in many developing countries, infrastructure investment grows up
quickly, but it has a limited impact on TFP. As [Hulten, 1996] stated, such a
failure may result either from low quality of the infrastructure due to poor main-
tenance, or from the fact installed capital is little used. In either case, rather than
the selection of a “bad” equilibrium, a “miscoordination” takes place between the
building agents and the repairing and using individuals and firms.
As [Farrell and Klemperer, 2007] said, the shift in game-theoretic terms from
the paradigm of the coordination in a “wrong equilibrium” to a model based on a
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coordination break means that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium should substi-
tute for an equilibrium point in pure strategies like [Harsanyi and Selten, 1988]s
“risk dominance” concept of solution.
However, mixed strategy Nash equilibria tend to be disregarded by economists
as a modelling tool, partly because they are inherently unstable (non-strict) and
in part because they seem unrealistic, since economic agents do not randomize
while taking decisions.
Nevertheless, this view on mixed strategy equilibria was changed by
[Harsanyi, 1973], who departed from an original finite game with complete in-
formation. He added a random variable to the certain payoff that each player
obtains from a given profile of pure strategies, while assuming that these distur-
bances might be correlated. Within this framework, each player may observe the
realization of his random terms, while he only knows the probability distribution
of the errors of the opponents.
[Harsanyi, 1973] shows that such an incomplete information game has necessar-
ily Nash equilibria in pure strategies, which are type contingent. Each player views
the type contingent, pure strategy used by the opponent as if he were employing
a mixed strategy. Hence, a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies always
“induces” a mixed strategy equilibrium. [Harsanyi, 1973] further demonstrated
that, in such a game, the “induced” mixed strategy equilibrium converges to the
mixed strategy equilibrium of the complete information original game, when the
variances of all random shocks converge simultaneously to zero.
Turning back to the original complete information game whose matrix is de-
scribed in Table 3, we realize that the Nash equilibrium mixed strategies are given








with α > 1 and 0 < f < 1.
Following [Harsanyi, 1973] these equilibrium mixed strategies express the im-
precise knowledge of each player concerning the opponents payoffs.
The kind of “miscoordination” that is typical of developing economies consists
in a situation where the Government provides an infrastructure, but the private
sector is unable to use it effectively because it fails to switch to modern technolo-
gies. The likelihood of this kind of “miscoordination” is,




Hence, miscoordination involving the proliferation of oversized infrastructures
becomes likelier if labour productivity is low in relation to capital intensity, i.e. if
aggregate productivity is low. Hence, the same causal factor (low TFP) explains
both the coordination of agents in the “wrong”, no-investment equilibrium and
a break of coordination. This idea can be already found in [Straub, 1995], who
contended that, according to experimental evidence, a large difference between the
conditions ensuring payoff dominance and risk dominance accounts for a break of
coordination in a 2× 2 game with two strict Nash equilibria.
In order to highlight the role of incomplete information in explaining a coordi-
nation break, we follow the path started by [Pontes and Pais, 2018] and transform
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the original game in Table 3 by adding a random variable θ to the payoffs of the
Government related with a decision of building the infrastructure. The payoff







a11 = 1 + θ,








b22 = f > 0
Table 4. Payoff matrix of the 2× 2 incomplete information game
after a transformation of the original game in Table 3 by adding
a random variable θ to the payoffs of the Government (Player 1)
related with a decision of building the infrastructure.
We consider that the Government has a dominant strategy and that the private
firms don’t know which strategy is this. This means that |θ| > 1. In practice both
players believe that θ takes values greater than 1 with probability p, and takes
values less than −1 with probability 1− p, but only the Government observes the
realization of θ, which is its own type.
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium can be computed as follows. For example, the
Government chooses “Build (infrastructure)” if θ = 2 and “Not Build” if θ =
−2, since each realization of the error term makes either pure strategy strictly
dominant. The Firm views the opponents equilibrium pure strategy as if it were
using a mixed strategy with probabilities p and 1 − p assigned to pure strategies
“Build (infrastructure)” and “Not Build”, respectively.
Hence, the equilibrium strategy of the Firm will be “Modern” if,
p b11 > (1− p)b22 ⇔ p(α− 1− αf) > (1− p)f ,





The Firm will choose “Traditional” in equilibrium if the reverse of inequal-
ity (16) is satisfied.
The set of beliefs by the Firm that drive it to switch to a “Modern” technology
decreases with the r.h.s. of (16), which in turn is inversely related with total factor
productivity. Hence, TFP is directly associated with a decision by the Firm to
change to a “Modern” technology.
We now assess the likelihood of a coordination break that leads to a situation
of oversized infrastructure. The Government decides to “Build (infrastructure)”
with probability p. But the privates sector refrains from using the new public
capital stock only if they stick to the “Traditional” technology. From (16), the
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Consequently, the domain of expectations by the Firm that are compatible with
the kind of miscoordination that is standard in developing economies expands with
the r.h.s. of (17), i.e. it is inversely associated with total factor productivity.
4. What if the game happens repeatedly over time?
Depending on many variables such as political, social and economic conditions,
Government might decide to invest in a particular region or in a specific area of
the economy. Moreover, Government also decides to invest if it knows from the
outset that private firms will accompany this public investment in order to value
it also with their private investment.
Usually if the Government do an investment, then the private firms that might
benefit from that public investment, conventionally will invest in the way to in-
crease their possibilities to obtain higher profits. Consequently, Government will
benefit in the mean and long run, directly or indirectly of this private investment
by the way of taxes that the privates have to pay over their profits, job creation,
stimulating the economy, and so on. It can happens however that the Government
decides do not invest. In that case, private firms will not invest either.
For each role in such interaction there is a customary and expected behaviour,
and private firms prefer to follow their expected behaviour, as long as the Gov-
ernment follows its expected behaviour. Under these conditions we say that Gov-
ernment and private firms follow a convention, in the sense that a convention is
an equilibrium that all expects.
A main question then arises: since our (coordination) game has two equilibria,
how do expectations become established? That is, which of the equilibria will
tend to be reached? Both, Government and private firms, decide to invest or both
decide no to invest?
In this section we will explore the evolutionary approach for these questions
following the arguments of [Young, 1993], considering that the game is played
repeatedly, either by the same or different players. Consider also that the past
decisions can have a feedback effect on the expectations and behaviours of the
players because thay can pay attention to precedent. Consequently, it may occur
that one equilibrium becomes established as the conventional one, not because
it is intrinsically prominent or focal, but because the process evolves to select it.
Some questions then naturally arise: does the game converges to an equilibrium?
If so, are all equilibria equally likely to be selected?
[Young, 1993] shows that the game asymptotically converges provided that the
underlying game has an acyclic best response structure and there is a sufficient sto-
chastic variability in the player’s decisions. In general, only one Nash equilibrium
will be achieved with high probability in the long run. [Foster and Young, 1990]
say that such an equilibrium is stochastically stable.
[Young, 1993] consider a n-person game that is played once each period and
the players are drawn at random from a finite population of individuals. In our
case we can consider the Government (a set of public decision makers) and a set of
interested private firms. Each player chooses a strategy based on his beliefs formed
by looking at what others players have done in the recent past. The author also
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assumes that the players occasionally decide with different strategies , or simply
make mistakes.
In coordination games, from any initial choice of strategies, there exists a se-
quence of best responses that leads to a strict pure Nash equilibrium provided
that the samples are sufficiently incomplete and the players never make mis-
takes. If the players occasionally decide with different strategies or make mis-
takes, [Young, 1993] shows that the game has a stationary distribution that de-
scribes the relative frequency with which the different Nash equilibria are achieved
in the long run. Depending if the probability of make mistakes is small, this sta-
tionary distribution puts almost all the weight on exactly one equilibrium, that
is, the stochastically stable equilibrium.
Notice that this concept of stochastically stable equilibrium significantly differs
of the concept of the evolutionarily stable strategies in the sense that the sec-
ond one is a strategy (or frequency distribution of strategies) that is reachieved
after a small one-time perturbation, while the first one is a distribution that is re-
peatedly reachieved when the evolutionary game constantly suffers small random
perturbations.
In the case of an evolutionary learning symmetric 2×2 game, where in each pe-
riod every player plays every other, and such that successful strategies are adopted
with higher probability and there is a small probability that players make mis-
takes, [Kandori et al., 1993] show that the risk dominant Nash equilibrium will
be achieved.
Considering the game defined by the payoff matrix in Table 3, we have that this
















Depending on a condition related with the number of plays that each player
can inspect from the most recent periods that the game was played, [Young, 1993]
prove that adaptive play converges almost surely to a convention. That is, adaptive
play without mistakes converges to one of the two possible pure Nash equilibrium.
Consider now the first and the second components of the mixed Nash equilib-








Notice that r1 + r2 = 1 and that R only exists as a mixed Nash equilibrium if
and only if 0 < r2 < 1 (or analogously 0 < r1 < 1), which is equivalent to the
conditions




that appear in (7) of Section 2, and that correspond to the green region in Figure 1.
Since r1 + r2 = 1, we can have three cases:
(1) 0 < r2 <
1
2 (which is equivalent to
1








that corresponds exactly to the green region in Figure 2. See also the
diagram on the right in Figure 3.
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(2) r2 =
1







that corresponds exactly to the blue graph that divides the yellow from
the green region in Figure 2;
(3) 12 < r2 < 1 (which is equivalent to 0 < r1 <
1






that corresponds exactly to the yellow region in Figure 2. See also the
diagram on the left in Figure 3.
Following the arguments of [Young, 1993] we deduce that if 0 < r2 <
1
2 (or
equivalently 12 < r1 < 1), two main conclusions can be obtained: the pure Nash
equilibrium (Does not build, Traditional) risk dominates (Build, Modern) – which
corroborates the conclusions obtained in Section 2 – and the unique stochastically
stable convention is (Does not build, Traditional). See Figure 3.
Figure 3. Diagram of the game with payoff matrix in Table 3,
where (0, 0) means that both players choose do not invest, (1, 0)
means that Player 1 chooses to invest while Player 2 chooses do
not invest, (0, 1) means that Player 1 chooses do not invest while
Player 2 chooses to invest, and (1, 1) both players choose to invest,
where we can see the stability sets in two cases, one where s1 <
1
2




In this paper, we addressed the issue of industrialization of a developing econ-
omy through a 2 × 2 coordination game involving asymmetric players, i.e. the
Government and a group of private firms, where each player decides whether to
invest or not. We surveyed two ways of solving this game by selecting one of two
strict Nash equilibrium points.
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In a first approach, we assumed that the game has complete information so that
its rules are common knowledge. With this framework, we look for an equilibrium
point in pure strategies. Industrialization of a backward economy can be ratio-
nalized by presupposing significant pre-play communication between public and
private participants in the context of payoff dominance by the overall investment
outcome. In alternative, a generalized move towards modern industrial technolo-
gies can dispense with explicit communication among the players if the starting
aggregate productivity is so high that investing is a sufficiently “safe” (i.e., risk
dominant) strategy for the private sector.
In a second approach, rather than explaining the failure of a backward economy
to adopt modern technologies by assuming that the players somehow coordinate
in a “wrong” equilibrium, we attempt to rationalize it by means of a break in
coordination. For that purpose, we searched for an equilibrium point in mixed
strategies, which we regard as an approximation of a pure strategy, contingent
type point of equilibrium of a game with incomplete information.
The two paths to address the failures to develop (selection of the “wrong equi-
librium” or “miscoordination”) single out the same obstacle to industrialization,
namely a low starting level of total factor productivity. Consequently, it seems
that a “Poverty Trap” indeed exists. A low initial level of TFP limits drastically
the investment in modern technologies and such a failure to invest (namely, in
infrastructures) keeps in turn aggregate productivity low.
However, this vicious circle can overcome if the public and private agents are
able to communicate and plan their investments jointly. Explicit coordination is
the way out of economic and industrial stagnation.
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